This article addresses the aspect of municipal solid waste management with a particular focus on household waste collection. Within this subject matter lies a peculiar governance challenge that manifests as a contesting, reciprocal dynamic between formal and informal collection systems: the two sides compete for economically valuable waste recyclables and discarded electronics, which prompt both domains to develop respective institutional structures aiming to dominate collection. For the purpose of answering the research question on formal rule effectiveness, the paper employs a theoretical framework based on the Old Institutional Economics. The thereof devised model is used to analyse (a) the historic shift form formal to informal waste collection dominance, (b) formal institutional responses in legislation, (c) the adaptive flexibility of the informal system and (d) the sequential interaction between the two systems. In conclusion, the analysis shows that the formal regulatory system may be interpreted as either ineffective or effective depending on the choice of perspective: formal institutions alone would not suffice to effectively collect waste recyclables and WEEE from households. Simultaneously, however, the formal system has provided a broad institutional leeway that enables informal collection to effectively solve this problem for the benefit of the urban Chinese WM system.
Introduction
In the twenty-first century environmental pollution may considered as one of the biggest challenges for the People's Republic of China (PRC): 50 million out of China's 1800 million mu of arable farmland is in all likelihood irreversibly damaged 1 and 40% a film produced by former CCTV journalist Chai Jing. 3 Similar to what the documentary suggests, recent research finds that less than 1% of the PRC's 500 largest cities met WHO air quality levels in 2012. 4 As estimated by some, this has led to a premature death of 1.6 million people annually. 5 Beyond these problems, urban China is confronted with yet another challengenamely, municipal solid waste (MSW). In general, households, next to commercial, industrial and institutional entities are considered as the major generators of MSW. 6 As for China, even the recent findings indicate the households alone account for 80% of MSW generated in Chinese cities. 7 The herein posed challenge for waste management (WM) is twofold: while waste constitutes a source of pollution, it simultaneously contains valuable resources that can serve as an industrial feedstock for manufacturing. The question of how to engage with this subject matter must, however, be solved within an ever narrower time margin: given China's particular development characteristics featuring enormous high GDP growth rates, the generation of MSW has equally exhibited an exponential increase over the past years. At present, MSW is estimated to grow by 6.5-10% annually, 8 which has turned the PRC into the world's largest MSW generator by 2011. 9 However, only 53% of MSW was treated safely in 2006, 10 which is especially worrisome, considering that MSW also includes various toxic elements included in Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE), 11 also known as 'e-waste'. It is especially this waste stream that represents the fastest growing fraction among MSW, with an annual increase of 12% from 2003 to 2010. 12 In light of this particular challenge, the question at hand is whether and how the Chinese government at central and local levels has responded. A review of preceding developments shows that the Chinese central government has indeed reacted at the policy and regulatory levels. On the one hand, the central government promoted ad-hoc measures for waste recycling and treatment, for example efforts to reduce the use of plastic bags in 2007 or since 2002 the shifting from waste landfilling to waste incineration as dominant final treatment method. On the other hand, new legal structures have gradually been erected. Apart from the last three 5-year plans that have increasingly put emphasis on environmental issues including WM, recent legislation has brought forward some significant milestones for tackling the economic-environmental nexus. Noteworthy examples include the Cleaner Production Promotion Law (CPPL) (2002), the Circular Economy Promotion Law (CEPL) (2008) and the most recently amended Environmental Protection Law (EPL) (2014). 13 An additionally challenging factor relates to the strong presence of informal actors in Chinese WM. Preceding research on this subject has shown that informal activities have permeated urban waste collection and recycling practices, and thus constitute an antipode to the formal structures of the state. 14 However, apart from a few exceptions, 15 little work has been done on how to integrate informal stakeholders or to which extent the Chinese institutional system has addressed this segment. For the evaluation on the effectiveness of the formal framework, these aspects are highly significant. Given that there are a large number of actors, who control substantial quantities of recyclables, any formal regulatory system adhering to the principle of environmental sustainability is bound to respond. At the international level, cases of how to positively engage with the informal sector are easy to find: Brazil has, for example, integrated informal waste pickers (catadores) in its 2010 National Solid Waste Policy Bill by assigning them with the task of waste collection. 16 In a similar fashion, India has recognised the informal sector as core of its recycling system, actively supports the creation of cooperatives for doorstep waste collection and promotes formalisation. 17 Given the obvious similarities of both cases to the Chinese situation in terms of a strong informal prevalence, the evaluation of regulatory effectiveness also considers these integrative capacities of the formal system. Given that the subject of waste encompasses a wide spectrum of fractions, this article is centred on the analysis of two waste streams, namely urban household waste recyclables (e.g. plastics, metals, paper, glass) and WEEE. Furthermore, the following paragraphs will not tackle the entirety of WM activities, but are confined to the initial, yet most crucial step for waste treatment, i.e. waste collection. 18 The rationale behind this approach is to investigate whether collection as the fundamental aspect in WM is properly addressed by China's formal rule system. In addition, the article will investigate if actual collection practices correspond to what is mandated by the formal institutional setting. As for the thematic choice to focus on urban household waste, the following sections will show that at this instance the clash between formal rules and informal habits and practices is most visible. The thereof derived findings will in turn facilitate an evaluation on the effectiveness of the formal system of Chinese WM.
Methodology and data
An inquiry into regulatory effectiveness should in first instance be based on a juxtaposition of the normative content of the rules in question and the respective practices of actors in reality. In this respect, Chinese urban WM displays a very dichotomous picture: on the one hand, municipal governments have in recent years established a variety of regulations and policies that mostly adhere to top-down governance ideals of the politico-economic logic of the Chinese Communist Party. 19 On the other hand, however, WM activities in large cities like Beijing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Shanghai are massively permeated by informal actors, a fact that stands in direct contrast to formal provisions. 20 In earlier articles I have shown that informal actors in fact dominate the collection of those waste fractions that bear an economic value, such as recyclables and WEEE. 21 Given this reality, it is quite astonishing that formal regulations and official actors tend to treat informal activities as either non-existing or undesired. 22 The thereof generated discrepancy between governance ideals reflected in Chinese WM regulations and actual practices, in which the informal recycling sector (IRS) dominates recyclable waste collection, gaving rise to the research question: Is China's regulatory system on urban household waste collection effective? The concept of effectiveness is herein measured by the degree to which actual waste collection practices correspond to what is stipulated by formal legislation. Vice versa, the rule-based operations of the IRS in collection help to assess formal regulatory inefficiencies and may be taken as a standard for possible formal institutional improvements.
The analytical model applied herein for the evaluation of rule effectiveness is built on the theory of the Old Institutional Economics (OIE) and addresses the following aspects: (1) The relationship between institutions and actors; (2) the dynamic between formal and informal institutions; (3) the aspect of institutional effectiveness.
From the perspective of the OIE, institutions are seen as systems of rules that structure the behaviour and interaction of economic actors. 23 The functional mechanism of institutions is to operate as 'socially transmitted and customary normative injunctions or immanently normative dispositions that in circumstances X do Y'. 24 This description may further be refined into ' … that in circumstances X induce actors to do Y'. The logic behind this theoretical extension is that the OIE sees actors and institutions as reciprocally moulding and shaping. This in part explains institutional evolution, as new ideals and values of involved actors once injected into the institutional environment in turn lead to a change in the institutional setting. In further consequence, this change then influences thought and behaviour of actors. 25 The OIE further addresses a second dimension of reciprocity, which is the interaction between formal (codified rules and directives) and informal (self-regulating and self-enforcing habits, norms, routines) institutions. The former is implemented via topdown means through an authority with executive force, such as the government. The latter category is devised and practiced by actors within a particular societal realm 26 and may upon effective imitation of others disseminate further in a bottom-up fashion. This typological distinction follows the ontological assumption that both realms are bound within a state of interdependency and reciprocity, 27 which at times feature oppositional, at times synergistic, but in all cases mutually responsive characteristics. This interdependent relationship thus constitutes an unfolding institutional dynamic of responsiveness and thereby perpetuates institutional evolution, i.e. rule-systemic change. The change perpetuating element of responsiveness is based on flows of information and signals: any change within one institutional side, will send out signals, i.e. computable information, to the other side. This flow of information is always constant, because even in instances where no change occurs within one institutional dimension, the institutional counterpart will perceive this absence of change. Thereupon following responses may be anything from changing nothing to enhancing the respective institutional system with additional rules. As for the case of Chinese WM, the most frequently encountered trend is that a change on one side triggers a response from the other, which in turn again induces a responsive change within the initial domain. 28 For Chinese WM the presumption is that, the interactive dynamic between the two institutional domains unfolds along the following pattern: if a certain aspect is unaddressed by formal institutions, informal rules emerge because of the hereby generated leeway, i.e. the lack of formal rules that govern a particular challenge. The creators and administrators of the formal institutional scaffolding are in consequence bound to respond: local and central government actors may in this context either remain inactive and ignore informal institutional practices (e.g. because they help to reduce the need for a public management of MSW quantities). Or, they may actively respond by renovating the formal rule structure with regulations that incorporate informal rule practices into the formal system or otherwise prevent them from occurring. In the subsequent phase of this dynamic, the informal rule system will respond to these novel formal settings, either by accepting them or by finding new ways to circumvent these. This responsive interactivity between two institutional domains not only moulds and remoulds the rules and behaviour of involved actors, it also propels the evolution of MSW management in urban China.
Institutional effectiveness is the central criterion for evaluating the formal institutional framework. Herein, effective institutions can be conceived as mechanisms to solve (reoccurring) socio-economic problems. 29 In their search for effective solutions, actors can either recur to institutions that proved successful in the past (imitation), or they may employ trial-and-error and experimentation approaches to devise new rule systems to engage a problem (innovation). Institutional solutions may take different forms and are not necessarily bound to the opposing institutional realm. The dynamic between both sides, however, again kicks in, once one side creates a new rule-system to engage a certain problem. Such activity will sooner or later induce the other side to respond via institutional means. Overall, every institutional solution exhibits varying degrees of effectiveness when it comes to resolving a particular problem. The less effective a solution proves to be, the more likely it is to be replaced by a new, updated institutional solution that outperforms the previous version. What is equally important, however, is the responsiveness cycle between the two domains: any response to an institutional solution will to a large extent depend upon its capacity to create a congruence in values and interests. Actors of one domain will more likely reject an institution of the other side, if they do not see their values and interests realised. The aspect of institutional durability, i.e. the temporal length of a solution's operation before its replacement, represents a useful proxy for the assessment of effectiveness. In this regard, MSW management presents a very interesting case: as will be shown in subsequent sections, the informal side has been more active and already began in the early 1980s to devise its own institutions. The government on the other hand only started to challenge informal rule structures in the mid-1990s. The major flaw of the formal rule-system, however, is not its comparatively late entry into the field. Rather, the lack of formal institutional effectiveness manifests in an outperformance or replacement through informal institutions in WM, e.g. in waste collection. The following sections will analyse the aspect of institutional effectiveness alongside four dimensions of institutional change and interaction, which are apparent in WM. As the framework figure indicates (Figure 1) , the discussion starts with the historic dynamics of institutional change that lead to informal dominance in collection. In the subsequent cycle, the state responds by increasing operative effectiveness through establishing a formal regulatory framework. After these temporal dimensions, the fifth section introduces the institutions of the IRS as a comparable standard for effective institutions in MSW collection. The final dimension thus displays the reciprocal dynamic between the formal and informal system, whereby aspects of institutional effectiveness are highlighted.
The data and evidence presented in this article stem from desk-top research on relevant data platforms (www.sciverse.com, and https://link.springer.com/) and from extensive field-work. Over the course of three research projects on Chinese WM between 2011 and 2016, the author has conducted several field trips in the PRC. 30 In this process, first-hand data have been collected and numerous interviews with formally, registered and unregistered, informal actors in urban WM were conducted. The contents of the interviews as well as thereof obtained data have been used with discretion and in a manner that does not affect the personal safety of the interviewees.
Historic dynamics: demise of formal and emergence of the informal collection system
Early before the founding of the PRC, concepts of waste recycling and reuse were present in Chinese society. In imperial China, human and animal waste was used as fertiliser to increase agricultural output or as a means for household heating. 31 In the early years of the PRC, the Circular Economy (CE) practices 're-use' and recycle were already encouraged under Mao so as to counter shortages in production: 32 given that consumer good and light industries were still insufficiently developed to serve the needs of the population, waste collection and recycling campaigns were routinely conducted to ease resource scarcities. For this purpose, corresponding structural support was provided via the establishment of recycling yards beginning in the 1950s 33 and official redemption depots (废品回收站), which were deployed in nearly every city block. After the delivery by residents or formal collectors, these stationary take-back points were stored and collected discarded products for repair or further transport to treatment and refurbishment centres. 34 Through these initial steps a gradual institutionalisation emerged, under which the collection and treatment of industrial waste was assigned to Material and Equipment Stations (物资局), which were subordinated to the Ministry of Industry. Household waste was managed by the Supply and Marketing Cooperatives (SMCs, 供销社) adhering to the Ministry of Commerce. The SMCs, in particular, had advanced the development of urban take-back stations into a dense network. 35 Via these official drop-off stations and collection centres, the government established an information network that allowed insight over secondary material flows and thus provided a feedback flow for the coordination of collection. And yet, this comparatively well-established system was bound to change in the course of reforms: Figure 1 . Analytical framework of the paper.
while waste recycling has reached its zenith in 1977, 36 municipal governments increasingly neglected their WM responsibilities during the 1980s, and instead reallocated a bigger part of their budget to projects that would yield economic growth. Despite the growth of industries using recycled materials, drop-off stations for secondary resources such as the SMCs or the depots were shut down in the 1990s 37 or relocated to suburban areas. Given that associated collection services were simultaneously reduced to a minimum, 38 urban residents found it increasingly difficult to dispose of their waste, which in many instances led to waste dumping practices within urban areas. 39 The developments at the time quite adequately reflect the interactive dimension between formal and informal institutional interaction: the retraction of formal structures not only induced residents to dispose of their waste informally but also in a habitual manner on the streets. Moreover, the demise of the formal system generated institutional latitude that was gradually filled out by new, informal structures: with the de-collectivisation in agriculture, surplus labour gradually migrated into urban areas for a better income. A part of these migrant workers also became engaged in IRS activities, including waste collection, where by the early 1990s they began to replace the retracting formal sector with a system of their own. 40 Over time, informal activities managed to permeate the entire WM service chain, most visibly in the field of waste collection, transportation and pre-treatment (i.e. sorting, separation, cleaning, bailing, material extraction). From the perspective of the OIE model, the emergence and gradual monopolisation of this task by the IRS could only happen because of the particular complementary effects between the formal and informal domains: informally organised doorstep collection services that now served formal storage depots have been perceived positively by residents and WM officials. The former wanted to see their waste taken care of and even to be paid for recyclables within it, 41 whereas municipal budgets perceived a benefit as they could economise on their WM expenditures. 42 Based on the tacit approval by society, informal waste collectors gradually began to monopolise the urban collection and trading of recyclable materials. 43 As these developments further increased throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the question occurs as to what extent the formal WM system has responded to the parallel structures of the informal system.
The response of the state: establishing a formal regulatory framework for WM
Faced with a growing, but uncontrolled IRS that ignored environmental sustainability and exchanged secondary resources for profit, 44 the Chinese government was bound to respond. The search for effective measures aimed to close the formal institutional loophole, which originally enabled the emergence of the IRS: Practically up until the mid-1990s there were hardly any legal or regulatory means to govern or structure urban WM in China. As can be discerned from Figure 2 , the first significant legislative milestone was the 1995 Solid Waste Environmental Pollution Prevention Law (SWEPPL), and it was not before the early 2000s that the building-up of the regulatory body for MSW management gained impetus. Moreover, the figure indicates that the legislation on WM is linked to the industrial policy strategy of the Circular Economy and Cleaner Production. Given their importance for China's future development path envisaged by the national leadership, 45 one may surmise that also matters of WM would increasingly come into focus of central and local governance. 46 It is noteworthy that the regulatory development of WM at the central level features a particular pattern of growth: the increase in regulations is not strictly linear, but exhibits development intervals with annual variations. Herein, it is the issuance of certain key laws that subsequently triggers a rise in overall regulations for the following years. In this regard the analytical model would suggest that the vigour in formal institutional replenishment serves two purposes: Firstly, the aim was to close previously neglected loopholes. Secondly, such changes set out signals of curtailment towards the informal domain. This can be interpreted as a general attempt to establish an effective institutional framework and thus rearrange MSW treatment along formal structures.
A closer look into the content of these key laws is useful to track the evolution of how waste collection has been addressed over time. The CPPL, although focussed on industry, touches upon waste in 9 of its 42 articles. 47 However the original and the revised version of the law remain silent on collection. The CEPL places a slightly stronger emphasis on waste (including those from households) as 20 out of 58 articles address this topic and Sections 5 and 6 are focussed on MSW. 48 In this regard, the CEPL has been hailed by previous research, as it accelerated the turn-out of legislative measures aiming to tackle urban WM. 49 As for waste collection, the CEPL is comparatively explicit as it allocates duties to local governments, who shall … support [italics added by the author] waste recovery enterprises and other organizations to conduct waste collection, warehousing, transport' and 'make a Figure 2 . Annually issued national regulations on WM.
comprehensive plan on building facilities for the classified collection and recycling use of urban and rural household garbage, establish and improve the system for classified collection and recycling use, and raise the recycling rate of household garbage.
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What is essentially indicated here is the legal suggestion to outsource tasks from local governments to private or state-owned enterprises. Such outsourcing, however, comes with the premise that actors in collection need to possess a license. In turn, this denies informal collectors, who are not willing to register and pay the necessary fees, the entry into the formal system. The most recent of the key laws addressing WM is the EPL, which became effective in 2015. Therein, only four articles touch upon WM, 51 which has been explained to the author as being due to the fact that the new EPL has mainly been designed to address issues of air, water and soil pollution. 52 The task of waste collection is allocated to local governments, but only in terms of 'comprehensive planning' and again less in terms of actual execution.
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The most detailed regulations for the collection of household waste are stated in the SWEPPLs. The 1995 version addresses collection in 14 of its 77 articles and determines that local governments and sanitary bureaus are responsible for collection and the provision of relevant installations for transfer. Collecting entities (单位) have to take preventive measures to avoid pollution, need official permits for treating hazardous waste (such as WEEE) and must undergo frequent training. 54 The 2004 and 2013
versions both address collection in the same 19 of 91 articles. However, here again the outsourcing of waste collection from the government to state-owned and private companies plays a central role: Although local governments above county level should comprehensively organise and arrange waste collection, they may also outsource these tasks via tender to outside entities on conditions set forth by the provincial government. Furthermore, any entity that is engaged in the development of new city areas, reconstruction of old areas, the construction of residential areas and in public property management, is directly responsible for the collection of waste within their vicinity. As stated in the 1995 version, waste collection by a non-governmental agency requires a management permit and registration from the government, and such agencies may be fined in cases of non-compliance. 55 Field interviews by the author, however, showed no evidence of such permits being held by informal collectors active in or nearby residential areas. Additionally, the interviewees reported that they rarely face any obstruction by the authorities when entering residential areas to collect waste or obtaining waste from companies. 56 Not only does this constellation enable the IRS to develop its collection practices, it also indicates that formal regulations fail to perform effectively in reality: despite the efforts to institutionalise WM practices, collection is in fact not appropriately addressed by the formal rule system. Evidently, the formal regulatory statutes do not signal sufficient force to impede collection operations by the IRS. Rather, it seems that the formal attempt to outsource collection duties to registered actors has generated a new institutional leeway: Formal collection is constrained due to shifts and overlaps in administrative coordination 57 and primarily focuses on the collection of residual waste. Under the pretext of 'outsourcing' collection, informal collectors appear to have arranged themselves with community management and thus continue to have access to waste recyclables from households. Albeit guaranteeing a certain degree of collection effectiveness, this constellation does not speak in favour of the formal regulatory structure. A similar contest between formal and informal systems occurs in the field of WEEE collection: this waste stream contains toxic as well as valuable fractions, which makes recovery a profitable, but dangerous business. Moreover, the proportionally largest sources of WEEE generation in urban China are private households. 58 In the former case all 47 collection stations could only recover 1/16 of the annually expected quantities and attempted inclusions of informal collectors failed. Also in Qingdao, the target of 600,000 WEEE units fell short of realisation, in major parts due to a negligence or expulsion of pre-existing informal collection networks. 63 Documentation for national pilots in Beijing and Tianjin during 2003-2006 is relatively scarce, but sources indicate that both pilots faced the similar problem of collecting WEEE: Here again formal stakeholders perceived informal actors as 'lacking standardisation and formalisation', 64 which provided a disincentive to formally integrate the IRS. This evidence in fact shows that pilot-specific regulations tended to replace informal collection with a parallel, exclusively formal system instead of integrating pre-existing informal capacities. The thereof created institutional contest did, however, negatively affect formal collection quantities, and thus revealed formal institutional ineffectiveness. By its very nature, institutional experimentation needs to be error-prone. Solely through committing, identifying and communicating shortcomings through information feedbacks, policy makers can learn about a particular problem and thus readapt the solution according to the given requirements. Indeed, the early pilots generated a learning feedback that lead to an improved pilot program, the Old-for-NEW scheme (以旧换新), which was implemented in nine pilot regions during 2009-2011. Herein, the novel approach was to subsidise the relevant formal actors, i.e. retailers, collectors and recyclers, and thus enable them to compete with the high prices commonly paid by the IRS to households upon doorstep collection. 65 The crucial learning effect was to set up a financial subsidy mechanism for the formal sector, which was thought of an investment for the build-up of a collection system. However, no regulations were issued to prohibit informal collection, 66 which in turn continued to represent an antipode to formal attempts of establishing respective collection schemes. Due to organisational advantages and higher cost efficiencies, formal recyclers simply started to use the subsidies for purchasing WEEE from informal collectors. According to interviews conducted with recyclers in Chengdu, Zhejiang, Wuhan, Beijing and Shanghai in 2015 informal channels provide approximately 80-95% of overall WEEE inputs to recycling yards. So, while the funding system facilitates the transfer of WEEE from households via the IRS to formal recyclers, it failed to effectively institutionalise a formal collection system. Given these experiences with local WEEE pilot programs it may come as a surprise to see that the current formal rule structure has not addressed the topic of WEEE collection in more detail. The WEEE directive as the currently most authoritative regulation merely stipulates that collection to can be managed via a 'multi-channel' (多渠道) approach. According to this provision, it is merely necessary for formal recyclers to document quantities and sources of collected WEEE. 67 However, what on first sight appears to be a regulatory ineffectiveness, may also be interpreted as a learning induced strategy within the formal institutional domain. After decision-makers realised the inability to formalise the IRS, they responded via creating a particular type of institutional latitude that in the end would yet serve formal needs: Firstly, the challenge of collecting household WEEE and transferring it to formal recyclers is solved, albeit through informal channels. Secondly, the directive stipulates that formal recyclers are relatively free to organise collection. Based on individual recycler's choices official subsidies might thus be employed in a way that guarantees sufficiently high recovery rates. This however comes at the risk of environmental pollution, which is generated when WEEE is channelled to still existing informal dismantlers. 68 Nevertheless, it could be interpretatively argued that formal institutional effectiveness is achieved via the intentional creation of loopholes that are tailor-made for existing informal collection practices.
Effective systems in WM: the institutional key features of informal collection
The previous paragraphs have outlined that the formal institutional framework exhibits specific deficiencies and latitude in regard to waste collection. This finding may lead to the assumption that urban WM legislation is falling short in terms of effectiveness. However, a proper answer to the question of what effectiveness means also needs to show which kind of institutional rule systems are in fact effective, how they work in practice and which options for emulation they offer. The following paragraphs will therefore look at the collection practices of the IRS, which exemplifies comparatively effective institutional practices. Previous research has in this regard shown that informal waste collectors have developed a set of institutions to improve their performance: (1) physical transaction structures, (2) communicative strategies and customerbased adaption of collection modes, (3) predetermined territory of collection with less emphasis on spatial expansion and more emphasis on maintaining a reliable customer base, (4) identification and appraisal of recyclables to properly adjust bargaining behaviour based on market prices for materials. 69 As outlined above, the late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a decline in formal urban WM structures, thus opening this segment for informal WM services, which have continuously developed in urban areas since the 1990s. In regard to the absolute numbers of informal actors active in urban WM, current research exhibits wide variances: For example in the field of WEEE management, some estimate that around 20 million migrant workers are engaged in informal collection and recycling of e-waste. 70 For WEEE collection alone, the estimates are as high as 400,000-440,000. 71 When taking a more general view on MSW, a recent study extrapolates that there are about 2.5-6 million informal actors active in urban Chinese WM, with 100,000-300,000 in urban Beijing alone. 72 These numbers are quite similar to findings of an earlier project, in which the author has been involved: based on observations of exchange structures, interviews and spatial analysis, we estimated that there are around 150,000 informal actors active in the collection and trade of Beijing's urban household waste. 73 One of the first features indicating effective institutional performance of the IRS relates to its system regarding the division of labour: different tasks are conducted by different actor groups, which in turn induces a high degree of specialisation and operative effectiveness. With regards to the IRS' organisation, three particular groups can be discerned: (1) Waste Pickers (WPs, 拾荒者), (2) Waste Merchants (WMs, 小商贩) and (3) Middle Men (MM, 中间商). This categorisation follows a distinction of two features, namely (a) collection capacities and turn-over and (b) mobility. The first group, sometimes derogatorily referred to as 'scavengers' (捡破烂儿), roams through the streets by foot and primarily focuses on refuse containers and dustbins for recyclable recovery. Their earnings are comparatively small due to their limited transportation capacity. Interviews with informal actors in Beijing, Wuhan, Chengdu and Shenzhen revealed that profits decreased as a response to falling prices for secondary materials during the last 10 years. This in turn means that higher turn-over can only be achieved by upgrading collection capacity and means of transport, which in turn may reduce the number of WPs over the long term. WMs, the second group, make use of motorised tricycles and focus on households and companies as main source of recyclables. Many of the interviewed WMs stated that they were WPs before and, after having saved enough money, purchased a tricycle so as to transport more recyclables and thus be able to achieve a higher income. MM as the third informally operating group mainly function as link between the manufacturing and recycling industry on the one hand and informal waste collectors on the other: they buy recyclables from WPs and WMs and sell these to industry or recycling enterprises. Their means of transportation are trucks, which makes them highly mobile and able to transport substantial amounts of waste over vast distances. Before selling the previously purchased materials, MM store and pre-process recyclables and WEEE at depots or open yards that are situated within suburban and fringe areas. 74 This particular division of labour indicates the high degree of organisation among the IRS, in which actor-specific specialisations have emerged as a response to the mechanisms of demand and supply: Demand from households for doorstep collection services and supply opportunities to provide materials to manufacturers or recyclers. This chain of collection and exchange services is as of now unmatched by formal structures, but could in turn serve as a standard for formal institutional structures. A key systemic feature is the physical infrastructure, which the IRS has established in urban areas: Via field surveys in Beijing, Shenzhen, Guangzhou and Wuhan, small market-place like structures for recyclable exchange have been identified. At these socalled trading points (TPs), waste collecting WMs and WPs convene so as to exchange recyclables for money with MM (Figure 3) . 75 The main infrastructure such as small booths with mobile scales is provided by MM, who thereby as to ascertain the weight of recyclables and calculate their pecuniary value. 76 In fact, the TP system may be seen as an institutional innovation and imitation at the same time: albeit being devised by the IRS, their functional design resembles the formal SMCs of the 1980s (see Section 3). Their abandonment created an institutional latitude, within which the informal TP system emerged. As for the operational characteristics of TPs, interviews with informal actors confirmed that most of the larger TPs are permanent and open for transaction from 11:00 a.m. to 19:00 p.m. seven days a week. TPs furthermore reduce transport distances, which constitutes a particular benefit for waste collection and transfer practices: Due to smaller transportation distances, collectors can more easily focus on strengthening the density of their customer base within a certain area, i.e. by means of establishing reliable relations with urban households. 77 The prevalence of a spatially limited operation radius corresponds to an earlier observation, which ascertained that approximately 70% of collectors focus on a working radius of 5 km. 78 The high density of TPs in Beijing equally benefits WPs and WMs, who depending on individual transport capacity can only manage to transfer materials within relatively short distances. Considering the significant function of TPs, an attempt was made to map their density in eight sub-districts of Haidian district. 79 Extrapolations indicated that the ratio of TPs per inhabitants in the district of Haidian equals 1:11,500. 80 If juxtaposed with formal waste transfer stations, the TP-system exhibits a much higher density and, critically, a location within residential areas, which in turn facilitates the transport (distance) and transfer (costs) of recyclables. Another significant element of the IRS in waste collection is effective communication. WMs, who provide door-step collection services, are for example highly dependent on building relationships with their customer base, i.e. households, who generate waste recyclables. Apart from simply waiting outside residential quarters to be called upon by residents, these collectors often put cardboard signs with their mobile phone number and the waste categories they collect in front of their tricycle while waiting nearby residential compounds (Figure 4) . Moreover, some of the collectors have business cards that they provide to households so as to facilitate the first step of establishing relationships with customers. In the course of several interviews this way of maintaining business relationships with households was referred to by informal collectors as most decisive for their work: it provides them with flexibility as they can align collection time and routes with the demand for waste pick-ups by the households. 81 For residents this service entails major benefits as it is free of charge and directly manages waste at their doorsteps. 82 This in turn generates a certain support for the informal system among residents, while it puts public-formal institutional structures, which are still based on a bring system, in a disadvantaged position. But also within the IRS, modern means of communication have an important function for the exchange of recyclables: MM confirmed that apart from going to designated TPs to purchase waste from informal collectors, they would also seek contact with specialised WMs via telephone, if it helps them to obtain a reliable quality of recyclables. 83 Finally, informal collection and transfer effectiveness including respective physical and institutional structures all depend on the value chain of the IRS and thereof generated profits. Firstly, profits can only be made from materials that possess a value for recycling, such as plastics, paper, glass, and metals. While there has been only little variation in collected fractions, the respectively recovered quantities have however changed over time: A comprehensive study from 2002 in Wuhan found that daily average collection quantities of the IRS ranged around 40-50 kg, sometimes reaching 100-150kg on 'lucky days'. 84 Data obtained by the author and colleagues during field visits in 2013-2015 showed that these amounts have actually more than doubled: tricycle riding WMs claimed that they would in worst cases 'only' collect 100 kg per working day, 150 kg under normal circumstances and 180-200 kg under most ideal conditions. 85 Additional surveys in the last two years, however, showed that recent macro-economic weaknesses have caused a decline in demand for secondary raw materials, which in turn has also led to general demise in collection quantities of the IRS. 86 Secondly, profits of the IRS also depend on the particular nodes within the informal value chain. Herein, households play a decisive role for two reasons: in urban China they constitute a proportionally significant source of generated waste recyclables and WEEE. Moreover, these discarded materials are considered as a valuable commodity in Chinese society, which stands in stark contrast to the perception of waste in the West. By implication, waste recyclables and WEEE gain in additional value with every sequence of transaction along the value chain. Given that the initial exchange occurs at the household level, establishing a direct connection to households decides whether waste materials are transferred to formal or informal channels. Within this subject matter, the question is which types of WM systems Chinese households prefer: a review of preceding research on this topic reveals a clear preference for informal over formal institutional systems (Table 1) .
As outlined in Table 1 , urban Chinese households tend to favour (þ) informal institutional structures and show little preference (-) for formal institutional structures, not only but partly because of the former offering a higher pecuniary reward. Thus it is not surprising that as of 2002, 95% of surveyed households in Wuhan sold their waste to informal door-step collectors instead of bringing it to formal redemption depots 87 .
Similarly, in Beijing (2005) 70.5% of surveyed households chose to sell their household WEEE via informal channels. 88 As for the prices paid by the IRS for recyclables, distinctions need to be made in regard to materials and the variation of spatial market prices. In general metals, especially copper, are at the upper end of the price range, whereas paper-based materials range at the lower end: according to a study on informal WM in urban China, 1 kg of copper was traded for around 50 RMB, whereas old newspapers were sold at only 1.3 RMB/kg. 89 Metals only constitute a small fraction of household waste recyclables (1%), whereas plastics (8%) and paper (6%) represent the biggest recyclable fractions in household waste. What needs to be stressed again is that with every transaction along the value chain, the value of the recyclables increases and the marginal profit decreases. Interviews with various actors indicate that the biggest increase in value occurs when households sell their waste to informal collectors; 90 these in turn will further increase the unit price margin when selling their waste to MM, and they will do the same for transferring the materials to formal material reprocessing companies. In field interviews in 2013 WMs indicated that they would add 0.2 RMB to every sold kg of waste paper and waste plastics; MM would subsequently add another 0.1-0.15 RMB per kg when selling to formal companies. Due to the different means of transportation and respective limitations in transportable amounts, the majority of tricycle riding WMs may make monthly earnings of 1500-4000 RMB, whereas the average Middle Man earns around 4000-7000 RMB/month. As for WEEE, the system is slightly more complex given that the informal market exhibits even bigger variations within different areas and different practices. For the IRS repair and refurbishing of devices is preferred over material extraction, as the former practice offers higher rewards once devices are resold. 91 Overall waste selling by residents and waste collection and transaction by informal actors puts both sides in a win-win situation, which makes informal structures in urban waste collection economically, and partially also environmentally, effective.
The institutional feedback cycle: formal responses to informal dominance
The preceding sections have shown that the IRS has established institutions for recyclable and WEEE collection, which are effective in several respects: the patterns are accepted by households, generate a considerable income for actors in the IRS and contribute to the recycling of materials. Given that formal legislation has not sufficiently addressed the aspect of collection and thus provided sufficient leeway for informal structures to continue, the question is whether there are direct formal responses to informal collection practices. Firstly, it needs to be pointed out that as of now the central government has hardly addressed informal activities in WM via relevant regulations. 92 However, at the local level, some regulations do in fact deal with the IRS: a frequently adopted measure is to strengthen law enforcement and thus put pressure on informal operators, e.g. by fining informal WM activities. However, such initiatives are mostly directed at large-scaled, informal recycling activities, which normally disperse very quickly just to relocate to another area without having paid fines. Informal waste collection per se is not punished, except for the expulsion of TPs from certain areas, which mostly results in their transfer to other, nearby areas. 94 In general, locally issued regulations that address informal waste collection activities aim to disperse, fine or prohibit the IRS to engage in WM. 95 It is difficult to gauge whether such normative measures will help to effectively replace the IRS. Observational evidence gathered by the author indicates that this approach only succeeds in relocating but not curtailing informal activities. Overall, the suppression of the IRS appears to be the predominant governance approach of local administrators: regulations that address informal waste collection-mostly as a subordinated feature of urban governancehave exhibited a clear tendency of prohibiting instead of integrating informal WM activities ( Figure 5 ). 96 There are considerable doubts regarding the effectiveness of this particular governance stance: Not only does it run contrary to some recommendations from academia, which argue in favour of considering cooperation with the IRS. 97 Moreover, this prohibitive approach seems to dismiss the experience derived from the evolutionary dynamic of both domains over the last 30 years. The case of Beijing does particularly well exemplify how the IRS has repeatedly responded to and undermined the mostly prohibitive and expelling strategy of the government ( Figure 6 ). Since the 1980s, the IRS has, especially in the field of waste recyclable collection, filled in formal latitudes and substituted the formerly abandoned formal structures. Any subsequent attempts to crack down the IRS have merely resulted in evasive measures of its actors, who resettle or transfer their business in nearby areas or simply become more vigilant in regards to formal controls. 98 This formal institutional response quite clearly aimed at eradicating informal collection structures. According to the logic of the analytical model, this institutional response of the formal domain would require the establishment of formal, physically and organisationally substituting structures. This again demands cost and time intensive efforts. In fact, Beijing has for the matter of collection initiated a pilot since 2000, which aims to generate effective solutions through the Figure 5 . Regulations issued by local governments for and against the integration of informal WM activities.
emulation of earlier formal collection structures as well as informal TPs. For this purpose, local administrators established collection booths for household waste recyclables within residential quarters, which in Beijing have amounted to 4,400 units in 2014. 99 The primary aim was to establish an alternative collection network encompassing formal waste transfer systems and urban households as generators, while simultaneously excluding any interference from the IRS. However, here again some issues relating to conceptional latitude occurred: not only do these formal, stationary waste buying depots offer less money to households for recyclables than the IRS. Moreover, the operators of these booths are mostly composed of former informal collectors, who take a job ordinary Beijing residents would not want to have. 100 Given these circumstances, the now formalised operators tend to resell these materials to the IRS, which offers a higher reward than do formal channels. This habitual practice is not only driven by profits, but also the result of good contacts that booth operators still have with the IRS. Therefore, the only option to which the municipal government currently seems to resort is the further expulsion of informal structures, such as in the waste village of Dongxiaokou. There, however, local informal actors simply tend to evade these measures through pre-emptive self-relocation. So, what can be observed in this particular case is the constantly active fly wheel of responsive action between two institutional domains. As for the above-indicated ineffectiveness of formal institutional measures, an explanation might be found in the ideological premise embedded in the official value system: it appears as if the internal governance logic of the state strives to incorporate WM activities within its own institutional domain and thus aims to oppress any activities that escape its control. 101 Another response of the government has been to transfer the public duty of waste and especially WEEE collection to formal enterprises. This has turned out to be very difficult, since formal collectors neither have the same network strength, nor can they offer the same monetary compensation to households as informal collectors do. 102 Thus, the formal response of official recyclers was to simply outsource this task to informal collectors from whom they receive recyclables including WEEE at negotiated prices. This integration of informal actors appears to bear the most viable results and formal recyclers have confirmed their dependency on informal supply channels as these provide 80-95% of WEEE treated in the companies. 103 This example in fact constitutes a, however indirect, form of cooperation or institutional synergy between the formal and the informal domain. While integrative approaches can offer a solutions to institutional conflict, problems occur once the formal domain enforces the formalisation of the IRS: Such an approach has been chosen in Lin'an city (Zhejiang province), where informal collectors were asked to register with the local government for the purpose of establishing a wage and safety scheme. Ultimately, only a few of these collectors registered as the majority could either not afford the registration fee 104 or was not willing to subordinate to a scheme that would regulate their collection activities and reduce their profit through the deduction of various fees. 105 
Conclusion
The research question at the outset of this paper asked for the effectiveness of the formal regulatory framework for household waste collection. In pursuit of an answer to this question, the article adopted a novel approach derived from the Old Institutional Economics. The thereupon conducted analysis focused on the institutional dynamics between formal and informal collection systems and produced two possible interpretations regarding formal regulatory effectiveness: Firstly, there is substantial evidence that the formal institutional system fails to manage recyclable and WEEE collection properly. Despite recent efforts to rebuild the formal regulatory framework, the challenging issue of collection has not been sufficiently tackled. This in turn enabled the emergence and persistence of informal institutional practices in urban Chinese WM. In direct response to these informal structures, local governments have implemented a broad set of measures that range from curtailment over prohibition to competition via parallel structures and enforced integration. However, because of the IRS' flexibility and adaptability, informal systems have so far been able to mitigate these measures. There are, however, good reasons for the government to adopt a more lenient approach and integrate the IRS into the formal system, which have been the governance choices in Brazil and India. Not only has the informal sector in collection developed a very sophisticated institutional system (i.e. division of labour, connection to households, TPs) that facilitates the reduction of waste quantities and circulation of secondary resources in the economy. Moreover, the IRS alleviates official WM budgets as a replacement of equal quality would entail high costs for municipalities. Finally, informal collection services provide incomes for an otherwise marginalised socio-economic group. The premise for such an integration to work for both sides would be to guarantee environmental sustainability, e.g. via trainings, as well as to safeguard the incomes of the IRS. If the state were to follow this approach, the best governance tool at its disposal would be the use of pilot projects. Attempts in this direction have been previously conducted in WM, so far however without incorporating the IRS, which in turn produced suboptimal effective results. Despite this apparent ineffectiveness of the formal system in waste collection, there is yet a second possible interpretation, which arrives at the entirely opposite conclusion. In fact the formal regulatory system on WM can be deemed effective when it comes to waste collection, simply because it provided a particular degree of institutional latitude that enables the IRS to continue its operations. Thus the mere existence of this sector may be interpreted as the result of the government's acquiescence of informal waste collection. Given the generally very authoritative governance mode of the PRC, it is difficult to imagine that the informal system could have evolved to its present level without the at least partial consent of the government. By implication, this approach may be interpreted as planned synergy between the formal and informal institutional domains, whereby the former betweenwhiles curtails the latter's activities and influence. In this case, overall institutional effectiveness is achieved via a tacit merging of originally antagonist, yet equally complementary institutional systems.
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